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Turkey’s position relative to Europe is analyzed from three different perspectives, i.e (i)
the semi-official perspective of the Copenhagen criteria, the Maastricht criteria and the
Lisbon strategy, (ii) the perspective of comparative surveys, and (iii) the perspective of
key European worries regarding future strains on cohesion funds and the complex
relationship of the Turkish population to European values. It is shown that Turkey’s
standing in international comparisons of good governance has been improving in recent
years and that the country is on a path of convergence with the Maastricht criteria. Turkey
falls considerably short, however, of the employment and education goals of the Lisbon
agenda.  Comparative surveys show the Turkish population to have not only a low standard
of living, but also a very low level of satisfaction with life and with public services, to have
comparatively little trust in other people and a low level of civic engagement, and to
nourish traditional attitudes concerning religious beliefs, women’s rights and gender roles.
Since Turkey’s admission to the EU would enlarge the EU population by 15 %, but
economic output by less than 3 %,  Turkey’s accession would severely strain EU cohesion
funds. Despite these reservations, Turkey’s admission to the Union is here advocated for
three reasons: (1) Risks of a fundamentalist backlash against Europe would considerably
increase if the long-standing accession promise were not kept. (2) Given that the country
is entering a very favourable demographic phase for about 2-3 decades, there is considerable
economic opportunity with a vast growth potential. (3) Since the recent Eastern enlargements
have already decided the debate between federalists and inter-governmentalists in favour
of the latter, Europe has more to gain than to lose from Turkey’s membership which would
strengthen the country’s ties to the West, and provide a chance of proving to the world that
the motto of the European Union “united in diversity” is a better model for the future of
international relations than the scenario of a “clash of civilizations”.PAGE 2
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1 Turkey in the light of EU policy goals:
A semi-official EU perspective
1.1 Turkey and the Copenhagen criteria
Turkey has a long-standing relationship with Europe (see Table 1). Being an associate
member of the EEC since 1963 and part of a Customs Union with the EU since 1996, it has
for a long time had a privileged status as a quasi-member of the Union. In 2005 the European
Commission decided to open formal accession negotiations.
Table 1: Historical steps in Turkey’s relationship to Europe
  
19
th century    Osman Empire participant in Paris Peace Conference 1856 and in Berlin 
Congress 1878 
  
World War I  
and aftermath 
Osman Empire part of German-Austrian alliance (325.000 casualties) Greco-
Turkish war 1919-22 
  
1923ff    Atatürk reforms adopting Western script and European legal systems 
  
World War II  Turkey neutral, but joining Allied powers in 1945 
  
Post World War II Period 
  
1949  Turkey member of Council of Europe 
1952  Turkey member of NATO 
1963  Turkey Associate Member of European Economic Community 
1987  Turkish Application for EC membership 
1996  Turkey forms Customs Union with the EU 
1999  Turkey obtains official candidate status for EU membership 
2000  Galatasaray Istanbul wins UEFA Cup 
2003  Sertab Erener wins Grand Prix d' Eurovision de la Chanson 
2004  European Council resolution to start EU membership negotiations with 
Turkey 
2005  EU membership negotiations begin 
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The Copenhagen criteria state that a country qualifies for EU membership if it meets three
basic criteria:
- a functioning market economy which can cope with competitive pressures;
- stability of institutions guaranteeing democracy, the rule of law, and human rights
with the respect for and protection of minorities;
- capacity to take on the obligations of membership including adherence to the aims
of political, economic and monetary union (adoption of the acquis
communautaire).
In addition the Union’s capacity to absorb new members also has to be considered.
Where does Turkey stand with respect to these criteria? In contrast to the new member
states acceding with the Eastern enlargement, Turkey has always belonged to the camp of
market economies, and it has recently been growing more dynamically than most of the
old member states. As shown in Figure 1, total economic output increased by 75 % in real
terms since 1990. This means that Turkey outpaced the rate of economic growth in
countries like Greece or Spain. This massive growth was partly, but not exclusively, a
function of population dynamics, because per capita GNP also increased by 25 % in real
terms between 1990 and 2004, despite the fact that the country weathered two major
recessions in 1994 and around the turn of the century (1999/2001; see Turkish Statistical
Institute, 2005, Tables 21.5- 21.6).
The Copenhagen criteria also call for stable democratic institutions and good governance.
Based on the constitution of 1982, Turkey is a parliamentary democracy with free
elections, a multiparty system and separation of powers between the executive, legislative,
and judicial branches of government. The independence of the judicial system is protected
within the constitution. Two international nongovernmental organisations - Freedom
House and Transparency International - monitor the observance of good governance by
gauging the degree to which basic human rights are observed and to which the government
and public administration are perceived to be corrupt. Table 2 shows where Turkey is
ranked in both dimensions.
The Freedom House index ranks countries in the two dimensions of civil liberties and
political rights on an index ranging from value 1 signifying “completely free” to 7 standing
for “unfree”. Countries with average index values of 1 to 2.5 are classified as “free”, those
with values from 3 to 5 as “partly free” and those above 5 as “unfree”. The average for EU
member states is 1, the worst performing country is Romania with an index value of 2.
Turkey is rated with 3, a value which is worse than anything found among EU member
states, but better than the country’s rating ten years ago. In terms of the international rank
order Turkey improved from the 68th percentile in 1995 (rank 130 of 191) to the 47th
percentile in 2005 (rank 90 of 192). Romania as the worst ranked EU-member state is found
on rank 64 or in the 33rd percentile.PAGE 5
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Figure 1: Development of real GDP in Turkey, Greece, Spain, and Ireland 
(1990=100)















Source: based on Eurostat (EDS) 2007.
Table 2: Measures of good governance
CIVIL LIBERTIES/POLITICAL RIGHTS 
(Freedom House Index ranging from 1-7; lower = better) 
 2005  1995 
Turkey  3.0 (47th percentile) 
(Rank 90 of 192) 
5.0 (68th percentile) 
(Rank 130 of 191) 
EU average  1.1  1.5 
EU Best  1.0 (14 countries)  1.0 (9 countries) 
EU Worst  2.0 (Romania = .33)  3.5 (Romania = .46) 
 
INDEX OF CORRUPTION PERCEPTION 
(Transparency International Index ranging from 0-10; higher = better) 
 2005  1995 
Turkey  4.1 (36th percentile) 
(Rank 64 of 179) 
3.2 (73rd percentile) 
(Rank 38 of 52) 
EU average  6.5  7.0 
EU Best  9.4  9.9 (Denmark) 
EU Worst  3.7 (Romania = .39)  3.4 (Romania = . 71) 
 
Source: Freedom House 2007 and Transparency International 1997 and 2007.PAGE 6
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The index of corruption perception ranges from 0 (“totally corrupt”) to 10 (“completely
incorrupt”). Hence in this index higher values stand for better performance. In 2007
Denmark and Finland were the best-ranked countries with values of 9.4. The EU average
stood at 6.5 (which would have been rank 28 or the 16th percentile in the country rank
order). Turkey obtained a value of 4.1 ranking at the 36th percentile (rank 64 among 179
countries). Romania was the only EU-country to rank worse (rank 69 or at the 39th
percentile with a value of 3.7). Bulgaria was rated on par with Turkey, and Poland was rated
only slightly better (rank 61). Compared to 1997, Turkey improved its rating, moving from
the 73rd to the 36th percentile position and from a value of 3.2 to 4.1. In other words, the
trend in Turkey is clearly positive, but the country is still quite a step away from Western
European standards of good governance.
This is basically also the verdict in the most recent EU Progress Report on the Accession
process which lists progress as well as continuing shortcomings (European Commission
2006). Among many other aspects the 93 pages report states that:
- There was progress in the fight against corruption (p. 68), but corruption is still
widespread (71), especially since members of parliament are granted very wide
immunity rights (11);
- human rights - and especially minority rights - still need to be strengthened as
there was only little progress in the protection of minorities (22, 23, 26, 71);
- the revised antiterrorism law with its penalties for “propaganda” and “praise” of
terrorism deviates from the definition of such crimes in the Council of Europe
Convention for the Prevention of Terrorism and curtails the freedom of the press
(6);
- article 301 of the new Penal Code suppresses the expression of free opinion by
penalising statements insulting Turkishness, the Republic or the organs and
institutions of the state, and restrictive jurisprudence lead, for example, to the
confirmation of a suspended prison sentence for the journalist Hrant Dink who
was later murdered by a gunman (16);
- the independence of the judicial system from executive control needs further
strengthening (66);
- the rights of trade unions and of trade union members remained impaired (21, 22);
- the right to conscientious objection is still denied (69).
After this mixed result concerning the Copenhagen criteria, let us now see how Turkey fares
with respect to the economic criteria of the European Growth and Stability Pact, i.e. the
so-called Maastricht criteria.PAGE 7
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1.2 Turkey and the Maastricht criteria
EU-Member countries which are to adopt the Euro need to meet certain so-called
convergence criteria. These are also called the Maastricht criteria, because they were
established at the Maastricht European Council of 1993. These include:
-a   low inflation rate which is no more than 1.5 percentage points higher than the 3
best-performing member states of the EU - which basically means an inflation
rate under 3 per cent under present conditions;
-a   low annual government deficit which must not exceed 3% of GDP;
-a   low accumulated government debt which must not exceed 60% of GDP.1
The purpose of setting these criteria is to maintain the price stability within the Eurozone
even with the inclusion of new member states.
Table 3 shows to what extent Turkey met the first three of these criteria in the most recent
period. The most recent Turkish inflation rate was not only higher than the EU target or
the EU average, but also higher than in the worst-performing EU member state, which is
once again Romania. However, given that Turkey consistently had double digit inflation
which ranged above 60 % throughout the 1990s, the recent lowering below the level of 10
% must be considered a major achievement. The public debt situation also improved
recently. The annual government deficit is even below the EU-27 average, whereas the
accumulated public debt has been lowered considerably since the economic downturn in
2001 and is now not far above the EU-27 average and lower than in three old EU-member
states (Italy, Greece, and Belgium).  In sum, Turkey seems to be on a positive path of
gradual convergence to the Maastricht criteria.
Table 3: Turkey and the Maastricht criteria
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1.3 Turkey and the Lisbon goals
The Lisbon European Council of March 2000 has set the strategic goal for the Union “to
become the most dynamic knowledge-based economy in the world capable of sustainable
economic growth with more and better jobs and greater social cohesion.” (European
Commission 2001: 7). Ever since the European Commission has been committed to the
triple goal of developing:
- economic policies ensuring growth and employment,
- educational policies enhancing human capital as Europe’s chief resource and
making people fit for the knowledge-economy,
- social policies combating social exclusion and fostering social cohesion.
Later the Gothenborg European Council of June 2001 added an environmental pillar to the
list of policy priorities thus underlining the importance of sustainable policies which do
not deplete natural resources. Abstracting here from environmental policy issues for
reasons of space, I will examine where Turkey stands with respect to some key aspects
relating to the first three policies.
With respect to employment policies, the Lisbon European Council set the goals to raise
the overall employment rate to 70% and to increase the employment rate of women to more
than 60 % by 2010. The Stockholm European Council of 2001 then added the goal of 50
% for older workers (as well as some intermediate targets to be reached by 2005). Table
4 shows where Turkey stands with respect to these goals and how it compares to EU member
countries.
By European standards, Turkey has a very low employment rate which is even 7
percentage points lower than the Polish rate that represents the EU bottom. A closer
analysis shows that Turkish men have similar activity rates as the average European, but
Turkish women only  attain about one half of the employment rate of Italian women who
are notorious for their particularly low level of formal employment in the old EU-15.2 A
further breakdown by age-groups shows that men at prime working age work similarly
often as their peers in the EU. It is clearly in the group of prime-age women where the gap
between Turkey and the EU is greatest.
With respect to educational policies, one of the official EU targets is to boost the
completion rate of upper secondary education among the younger generation (20-24) to
at least 85 % by 2010. Figure 2 shows how Turkey fares in this respect in a comparative
perspective. The total adult population (aged 25-64) is still below the 85 % target in all
European countries except the Czech and the Slovak Republics. Portugal is the only country
beside Turkey where educational poverty in the sense of not having an upper secondary
education certificate is still very widespread and where less than one third of the adult
population has a degree in higher education. Higher learning is much more widespreadPAGE 9
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Table 4: Turkey and the employment goals of the Lisbon strategy
Source: Eurostat (EDS) 2007.
  TURKEY 
Lisbon 
goal  EU-25  EU-27  EU Top  EU Bottom 
Employment rate  46.0 70  63.9  63.4  75.9  (DK)  52.8 (PL) 
Men 68.2    71.3  70.8  79.9  (NL) 58.9  (PL) 
Women  23.8 60  56.5  56.2  71.9  (DK) 33.7  (MT) 
Age 25-54  54.2   77.3  77.1  84.5  (DK)  62.4 (MT) 
Young (15-24)  31.3     36.8  35.9  65.2 (NL)  21.2 (MT) 
Old (55-64)  31.0  50  42.5  42.3  69.4 (SE)  27.2 (PL) 
Men 25-54  81.5     85.5  85.1  92.8 (LU)  75.7 (MT) 
Men 15-24  42.8    39.7  38.8  65.5 (NL)  21.2 (LT) 
Men 55-64  45.4     51.8  51.5  72.0 (SE)  35.9 (PL) 
Women 25-54  26.3   69.1  69.0 81.1  (SE, SI) 35.4  (MT) 
Women 15-24  20.3     33.9  32.9  64.9 (NL)  17.4 (LT) 
Women 55-64  17.1     33.7  33.5  66.7 (SE)  12.4 (MT) 
   
Figure 2: Percentage of the population (aged 25-64 and 25-34) that has attained at least 
























Age group: 25-64 Age group: 25-34
Source: OECD 2007, Education at a Glance 2007 (Database). PAGE 10
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among the younger generation, where even the EU-average already comes close to the
official target. Portugal is the only European OECD-country where less than half of the
young are in possession of an upper secondary degree. The pace of educational expansion
was even lower in Turkey which falls behind Portugal in the younger age-group.
This shows that Turkey must not halt in its attempt to further expand public schooling.
It is true that due to the steep decline in birth rates the size of the school age population
has already peaked and will remain fairly constant in the next two to three decades.
However, school attendance is close to 100 % only in the age cohorts who are subject to
the eight years of compulsory schooling. Attendance rates in higher age groups need to be
more than doubled if the country is to come close to European standards and to cope with
the requirements of the knowledge economy. Hence considerable further increases of the
educational budget are clearly in place.
With respect to social cohesion, the EU has not set precise policy targets, but it is clearly
committed to reducing not only regional differences within the EU, but also social
exclusion within member states. One of the classical indicators of social exclusion is the
relative income poverty rate. It shows the proportion of people who have to live on less
than one half of the median equivalent disposable household income of one country (where
equivalent means that the household income is weighted by the number of household
members). The respective numbers - as well as the proportion of people “at risk of poverty”,
i.e. having less than 60% of the median income weighted by household size - are regularly
published by Eurostat, the statistical office of the European Union. The margin of variation
in the EU-25 is very large, ranging from 5 % in Finland, Sweden, and the Czech Republic
to 14 % in Lithuania and Poland in 2005.
One must bear in mind, however, that these data show only who is under a nationally
defined poverty line which may vary widely from country to country. This means that a
citizen living at the 50 % national poverty threshold in rich countries like Sweden,
Denmark or Luxembourg has several times the income of someone living at the apparently
same relative poverty line in a poor country like Estonia, Latvia, Bulgaria or Romania.
Figure 3 illustrates how different the level of actual deprivation connected with relative
income poverty is in various countries and where Turkey stands in both respects. Two
features are particularly noteworthy. First, in 2003, countries with similar rates of relative
income poverty such as France, Latvia, Lithuania and Poland had widely discrepant
proportions of people experiencing harsh deprivation. Whereas less than 2 % of French
respondents suffered simultaneously from four criteria of hardship, more than 10 % in
Poland, Latvia, and Romania did so. Second, Turkey stands far apart from other European
countries in both dimensions. Almost every fifth Turkish citizen lived in relative income
poverty in 2003, and almost 14 % of Turkish respondents had to cope with very dire
circumstances.3 This shows that the Turkish level of living is still far below European
standards.4PAGE 11
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In the absence of more recent data on relative income poverty and the actual level of
material deprivation, the Human Development Index published by the United Nations
Development Programme (2006) is a useful alternative measure of the absolute level of
well-being. It combines a measure of material well-being (per capita GDP) with a measure
of health (life expectancy) and another one of education (literacy) in the light of the global
distribution of these attributes. According to the United Nations countries with a value
below 0.5 belong to the little developed group, countries with values between 0.5 and 0.8
are counted to be at intermediate development, and countries above 0.8 are ranked as highly
developed. All EU member states belonged to the group with a highly developed HDI in
2004. The lowest ranking EU-member - Romania - is found on rank 60 with a value of 0.805.
Turkey ranks on position 92 with an index value of 0.757. These data show that Turkey still
lags clearly behind EU member countries despite its impressive recent record of economic
growth. In the next step I will examine how Turkey fits into the European social space based
on more sociological data from recent surveys.
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Figure 3: Relative income poverty and material deprivation
in Europe (2003)PAGE 12
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2 Conspicuous features of Turkish society from a
comparative sociological perspective5
2.1 Subjective well-being and concepts of accountability:
A dissatisfied population
A few years ago German newspapers reported on the Turkish Quality of Life Survey in 2003
stating that Turks are poor but happy. This is not what our data show. In fact, Turkish
citizens are painfully aware of their dire circumstances. As shown in Table 5a, their
satisfaction with their standard of living is much lower than in all EU-countries with the
exception of Bulgaria. Their general life satisfaction is similarly low, ranking closer to the
minimum level found in Bulgaria, than in any other EU member state.
If poverty is widespread, a decisive question is how it is interpreted. Is it seen as a result
of individual shortcomings or rather as a result of collective processes beyond the
individual’s control? The remarkable feature about Turkey is that a large majority of its
citizens sees “injustice in our society” as the key determinant of living in need.6 This means
that there is a considerable potential for the political mobilization of discontent.
Compared to the citizens in post-communist countries, Turks are, however, less likely
to hold the government responsible for providing for everyone. When given a choice
between more government responsibility and more personal responsibility, the average
Turkish citizen is slightly more in favour of enhancing individual responsibility. In this
respect Turkish respondents resemble the average West European more than the citizens
of the new member states.7
Even though they do not hold the government responsible for providing for everybody,
Turkish citizens have a very unfavourable impression of the quality of public services
(Table 5b). The poorest rating is given to the quality of the health care system despite the
fact that the satisfaction with one’s own health is quite high. All other public services are
also graded much worse than is the case in Western Europe. The only exception is that Turks
have more trust in their pension system than either West or East Europeans. Whether this
reflects an awareness of the favourable demographic situation of the country or simply
ignorance about the European debates on the future sustainability of pension schemes is
not clear - but as we will see below, Turkey does benefit from an extremely favourable
demographic situation for the decades to come.PAGE 13
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In sum, Turkish citizens are aware of severe hardship and highly critical of the quality
of state services. If politically mobilized, this high level of discontent could become a very
severe challenge to the political elites, if not to the entire political system. A crucial
question then is to what extent civil society networks serve to cushion or channel this
discontent.
2.2 Trust, social cohesion, and civic engagement: A weak civil society
The surveys probing into social relations and civic engagement show that Turkish citizens
are closely integrated into a web of exchange with family and friends, but are only very
loosely related to the larger society around them (Table 5c).
Trust in other people - one of the crucial indicators of the social capital of a society -
is a conspicuously scarce resource in Turkey. Only Bulgarians display similar levels of
distrust in their fellow citizens as Turks. Turks are also more likely than West Europeans
or citizens of the new member states to see their society as conflict-ridden and to perceive
strong tensions between social groups. In contrast to Western Europe, where ethnic
tensions are now perceived to be more pervasive than the old conflicts of industrial society
between management and workers or rich and poor people, the Turkish population still
considers the tension between rich and poor people to be the central conflict. Turkey is also
the only country, where all lines of cleavage, including tensions between men and women
or old and young people, are perceived as intense.
A weak civic engagement is the mirror image of the strong distrust of other people and
the perception of society as conflict-ridden (Table 5d). The percentage of people engaging
in voluntary work or participating in voluntary organisations is distinctly lower than in the
old and the new member states of the European Union. Only Bulgaria and Romania display
a similar pattern of restraint in civic activities.
The abstention from civic engagement does not mean that Turks are egotists who do not
like to co-operate with others. Quite the contrary: They help people living outside their own
household even more frequently than all other Europeans with the exception of Romanians.8
As their high satisfaction with family life shows, they merely restrict their social life to
relatives and friends in their immediate vicinity. In contrast their, satisfaction with social
life in general is low and clearly below the European average.
In sum, we see the image of a society where people withdraw into an inner circle of trust,
but abstain from more formal social relations and from civic engagements. This is probably
also a reaction to strains of anomie accompanying the steep population growth, and the
massive migration from the countryside to the cities which characterised Turkish society
in the past decades.PAGE 14
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2.3 Cultural orientations: Traditional values concerning religion,
minorities, and gender roles
To what extent has the urbanization process transformed the cultural orientations of the
Turkish population? The answer is: So far remarkably little. With respect to religious
beliefs, tolerance for deviant life-styles and gender roles, the Turkish respondents hold
much more traditional views than their peers in Western or Central Europe. I can illustrate
this by showing how frequently people believe in the existence of heaven, hell, and a life
after death on the one side and how frequently they express tolerance for abortion, divorce
and homosexuality on the other (Figure 4). In both dimensions, the Turkish respondents
are far away from Europeans or even Americans who hold the most traditional views in
the West. We also see that religiousness tends to be associated with less tolerance for
deviant life-styles.
With respect to gender roles, Turks are conspicuous for their highly traditional and
patriarchic views (Table 5e). Nowhere in Europe is the percentage of women who work
informally as homekeepers nearly as high as in Turkey. Almost three quarters of Turkish
women are daily involved in child care, whereas this is true for far less than one half of
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the women in the European Union. In contrast, the proportion of Turkish men who say that
they spend every day some time on housework is only half as high as in EU-countries.
Obviously Turkish women do no longer consider this division of labour fair, as 70 % of
them feel that they are doing more than their fair share, a complaint which less than 40 %
of the female respondents in EU-countries express. The steep decline in Turkish fertility
rates - from 4.4 in 1980 to 2.2 in 20059 - and the fact that Turkey is the only European country
where a majority of the women with completed fertility (age 40-64) declare to have had
more children than they desired (Fahey 2006: 42-43) is a further indication that Turkish
women are no longer willing to accept the old patriarchic order.
2.4 Empirical summary: Where Turkey stands in the European social
space
To summarise the empirical findings, Figure 5 shows where Turkey fits into and where
it deviates from the European social space by comparing Turkey to the average, the
minimum, and the maximum value in the European Union. Highlighting the most
conspicuous facts, the following points can be made.
Obviously Turkey is the poorest country in the widely defined realm of the EU.
However, it recently had above-average economic growth rates. Its employment rate is
conspicuously low, and in six more cases Turkey stands out with extreme values far out
of bounds of the EU: (1) The poverty rate is higher, (2) the existence of need is more
frequently related to injustice in society, (3) women are more frequently confined to the
role of housekeepers, (4) the fertility rate is still higher than elsewhere in Europe, (5)
religiousness is more widespread, whereas (6) participation in higher education is less
frequent.
Now what does all this mean for the question of Turkey’s accession to the European
Union? Reflecting on this normative question, I will first describe some of the key
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3 Should Turkey be admitted to the EU despite
justified European worries?
3.1 Key European worries
3.1.1 Turkey and the strain on cohesion funds
The first worry is that Turkey’s accession would be a major strain on EU structural funds
and that this would outrun the capacities of EU cohesion policies which are committed to
the convergence of European living standards.
If Turkey were admitted to the European Union, the EU population would increase by
15 % whereas economic output would grow by less than 3 % (European Commission 2004:
38). With its 72 million inhabitants, Turkey would have the second largest population in
the EU, but the size of its GDP (in Euros) would only be on rank 8. Measured in purchasing
power parities, the Turkish GDP per head would amount to roughly one fourth of the EU-
25 average (which is the yardstick frequently used in EU official documents). This means
that the gap in the standard of living that separates Turkey from the EU average is about
just as big as the gap that separates Mexico from the United States. Hence there are also
fears that massive cross-border migration would set in.
I will not deal with the migration issue here but focus on the consequences for EU
cohesion policies instead. As all Turkish regions would be below 75 % of the average EU
GDP per capita, they would all be entitled to support from EU structural funds. Aid from
the structural funds is limited to a maximum of 4 % of the recipient country’s GDP. The
Turkish GDP was given by Eurostat (2007) as 290.5 bio Euros in 2005. 4 % of this sum
amount to 11.6 bio Euros.
Standing at a share of 1.9 %, Greece is currently the country receiving the highest
subsidies from EU structural actions relative to the size of its GNI. The highest proportion
of all appropriations for structural actions currently goes to Spain and amounts to 17.8 %,
or 5.8 bio Euros in absolute terms.10 It is estimated that if Turkey were now an EU Member
State, it would receive about 27 % of Structural Fund appropriations, and that its share in
Structural Fund payments would raise to roughly one third (32 %) by 2014 (European
Parliament 2006: p. 5; p. 10). By 2025 it would receive 26 billion Euros annually fromPAGE 19
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Structural Policy measures alone (European Parliament 2006: 5). A European Parliament
document concludes that payments of this magnitude would be “politically unrealistic”
and claims that the challenges to European Regional Policy would “outstrip the funds
available” (European Parliament 2007: 11).
There are two more issues involved here. The first is that an effective channelling of
EU structural funds into economic development requires administrative capacities, good
governance free of corruption, and an educational infrastructure which would promise
synergy effects (Rose and Öczan 2007). It is important for young Turkish leaders to
understand that resistance to the country’s accession within the EU will diminish the more
progress is made in the realm of good governance.
The second issue concerns the so-called statistical effect of enlargements. Since the
entitlement to the so-called objective 1 support is limited to regions with less than 75 %
of the average GDP per capita in purchasing power parities, hitherto entitled regions lose
their claim if poorer countries join and decrease the average GDP per head, thus lifting them
statistically above the 75 % threshold. If Turkey and all candidate countries in the Balkans
joined, a recent European Parliament document estimated that one third of the current
regions eligible for structural funding would lose their objective 1 status (European
Parliament 2007: 10).11
Hence there are serious economic reservations. However, there are also worries
concerning Turkey’ relationship to democracy.
3.1.2 Turkey and its precarious relationship to democracy
We all know that the Turkish military intervened three times - 1960, 1971, and 1980 - to
change the course of Turkish politics, and in more moderate and soft form it has done so
again this year intervening - unsuccessfully as it seems - into the presidential election.
With more than half a million soldiers, the Turkish armed forces are the biggest army
in Europe. In relative terms, only Greece and Cyprus have even larger proportions of their
populations under arms. The ratio of military expenditure to education expenditure may
be considered a good indicator of the degree of civilianization of the state. There are only
four European countries where the military budget is bigger than one half of the education
budget. Turkey is one of them, preceded only by Greece (Figure 6).
Survey data show that the Turkish population is unique besides Romania in thinking that
it would be a good thing to have a strong leader who would not have to bother with
parliament or with elections (Table 5f). It is true that Turks consider democracy to be the
best form of government just as frequently as other Europeans. However, their support is
also not more solid than in other European countries, as less than half are ready to say thatPAGE 20
WHERE TURKEY STANDS IN EUROPE AND WHY IT SHOULD BE ADMITTED TO THE EU
having a democratic system is good. Given the high discontent with the quality of public
services, Turkish policy makers should take this a serious signal that under adverse
economic circumstances the support of their democratic rule might be withering.
Finally, Europeans are concerned to what extent the Turkish population would share the
European values of freedom, pluralism and tolerance for diversity.
3.1.3 Turkey and its complex relationship to European values
Cultural reservations about Turkey concern two major issues: (1) Does an Islamic society
fit into the Western value community? (2) Can an Islamic society fully subscribe to the
EU emphasis on gender equality? Let us quickly examine the empirical evidence on these
points.
With respect to religion, the evidence is mixed. We have already seen that Turks are
more religious and less tolerant in life-style issues than EU-citizens. They are also less
likely to consider non-believing politicians fit for office (Table 5g).
On the other hand, we must not exaggerate the differences regarding religion. It may
come as a surprise to Turkish readers that there is only one European country - the Czech
Republic - where less than half of the population professes to believe in God.12 Two thirds
























Figure 6: A measure of civilianization of the state: 
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(France, the UK, Estonia, and Sweden, besides the Czech Republic) where less than half
of respondents do so. Finally, large majorities of Turks and EU-citizens are in agreement
that religious leaders should not influence voters or government decisions.
The second cultural divide concerns the social position of women (Table 6). The Turkish
state granted women the right to vote rather early, but the representation of women in
parliament is still far below the EU minimum. On the labour market women are barely
visible, as most of them are engaged in informal household work, and only a small minority
is found in paid employment. A large proportion of Turkish women lack higher education,
and the most disconcerting finding in this respect is that the educational gender gap has
even grown larger in the youngest age-cohort according to OECD statistics.
Thus, rather strong cultural differences cannot be denied. My main argument in this
respect is, however, that cultural preferences are not constants, but very amenable to
changing conditions. The German case makes this particularly clear. After the Second
World War, many intellectuals claimed that Germany did not belong to the culture of the
West, and there were quite a few survey results to sustain this view (for a summary see Alber
2004). However, when the country was integrated into NATO and the EEC, and prosperity
ruled, German attitudes changed rather quickly. By the 1980s, German attitudes had been
profoundly transformed and were no longer different from the ones in western neighbour
countries. Hence the German example shows that the integration into international
Table 6: Indicators of the position of women in society
 



















EQLS  67  1 









At least upper secondary  
education among 25-64 years  
old (2005) 





Gender gap in at least upper  
secondary education among  
25-64 years old (2005) 





Gender gap in at least upper  
secondary education among  
25-34 years old (2005) 







WHERE TURKEY STANDS IN EUROPE AND WHY IT SHOULD BE ADMITTED TO THE EU
networks of exchange and co-operation - coupled with inner-societal modernization
processes - can lead to an evaporation of traditional orientations, and in this sense there
is no historical path dependency or historical determinism.
3.2 A personal balance sheet: Why Turkey should nevertheless be
admitted to the EU
3.2.1 Backlash potential if promises are not kept
There is no denial that the European attitude on Turkish accession has also been subject
to change (Figure 7). Europeans are much more against Turkish membership today than
a few years ago. In Turkey, on the other hand, there has not yet been a clear backlash so
far. Yet the survey data do show that the enthusiasm about EU membership is waning in
the Turkish population (Figure 8).
A reading of the EU reports on the progress of accession negotiations clearly shows how
much the promise to become a Union member has already contributed to a massive
transformation of Turkish institutional structures including several modifications of the
constitution. If all this would prompt the European Union to deny accession and merely
grant a privileged status as associated member, chances are that there would be a
fundamentalist reaction against Europe and the West. Hence I think that the European































































Question: Would you be in favour or against turkey becoming part of the European Union in the future? 












































































Question: Generally speaking, do you think that our country’s membership of the EU would be…? - A good thing. 
Sources: Eurobarometer 62: 70; Eurobarometer 63: 97; Eurobarometer 64: 56; Eurobarometer 65: 76; Eurobarometer 66: 119; 
Eurobarometer 67 - First results: 16.PAGE 24
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3.2.2 Economic chances given a widely open demographic window of
opportunity
Allowing Turkey to join the Union would also give the EU a chance to benefit from the
massive economic growth that can be expected in Turkey for the next two to three decades.
For some time to come Turkey is blessed with an almost unique demographic window of
opportunity (Figure 9). The population at working age will increase steeply, while the size
of the dependent population will grow only moderately. This means that the dependency
ratio will shrink from 0.66 in 1990 to 0.48 in 2030. In other words more people will be able
to produce the economic output needed to sustain the non-working population. This should
allow for an economic spurt in which the EU would be wise to participate lest growing
proportions of trade go outside the EU.
Three cautioning remarks are in place, however. First, a larger population at working
age also requires more jobs. So far, the high economic growth rates have not translated into
a job machine, and Turkey experienced jobless growth in recent years (Figure 10). This
is in stark contrast to developments in the new member states where economic growth
recently translated into sizable employment growth (Alber 2007). Why the Turkish
economy has such difficulties in creating jobs would require further analyses which are
beyond the scope of this contribution.
Secondly, the stagnant number of young people should not be understood as a
legitimation to spend less on education. Competitiveness in the globalised world means
above all having an educated and hence highly productive workforce. Turkey needs to
channel more funds into education and to augment the proportion of people with at least
upper secondary education.
Third, it should not be overlooked that the elderly population is growing at an even faster
rate than the population at working age. Between 2000 and 2030 the number of older people
will almost treble, and the old age dependency ratio will rise from 0.09 to 0.16. In other
words, Turkey will need to spend more on the young population in the education system
and on the older generation who will require pensions as well as care services. Yet the
demographic window of opportunity allowing some leeway for policy makers and
promising a phase of dynamic growth will be wide open for at least two decades.PAGE 25
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Figure 10: Jobless Growth? Development of real GDP and employment in 
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Figure 9: The demographic window of opportunity: 
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3.2.3 Political chances: United in diversity instead of a clash of civilizations
Finally, the European Union has much to gain politically from a firm integration of Turkey
into its ranks. The phase of deepening the Union seems over anyhow, now that the threat
of communism has vanished and the memories of the Second World War which fuelled
the process of European Unification are fading. After the recent Eastern enlargements, it
seems that the debate between federalists and inter-governmentalists has been decided in
favour of the latter and that the inter-governmentalists understanding the Union more as
a zone of close co-operation among national governments than a new form of supra-
national state have carried the day.
If this is so, increasing diversity within the Union must not necessarily be seen as a
threat. If Turkey joined the Union, this would be proof that an Islamic society can be part
of the West. Turkey could become the vanguard of democracy in the Islamic world,
Europeans would for the first time win access to the Organization of the Islamic
Conference, and the world would get convincing proof that the motto of the European
Union “united in diversity” is a better model for the future of a globalised world than the
“clash of civilizations”.PAGE 27
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Notes
1 In addition there are some other criteria which need not concern us here any further. Applicant
countries
- should not have devaluated their currency for 2 consecutive years and should have joined
the exchange-rate mechanism (ERM II) under the European Monetary System (EMS);
- and should have long-term interest rates that must not be more than 2 percentage points
higher than the 3 best-performing member states (based on inflation).
2 In the EU-27 Malta has the lowest rate of female employment (34 %), followed by Italy
(45 %).
3 The index of material deprivation is a summary measure of cumulative deprivation in four
dimensions, stating the percentage of people suffering from the following shortcomings,
based on the 2003 European Quality of Life Survey (EQLS):
- cannot afford at least four of six consumption items (Q 20),
- feels great or some difficulty to make ends meet (Q 58),
- is in arrears with at least one of two housing payments (Q 59),
- ran out of money to buy food within past 12 months (Q 60).
4 At the same time the degree of income inequality in Turkey is very high. The Turkish Gini-
coefficient of 0.45 is higher than the EU maximum of 0.410 found in Portugal and 41 % higher
than the EU-25 average (0.310) - taken from Eurostat (2007).
5 This section builds on earlier work published in Alber (2004) and Alber (2006).
6 The question (no 41) in the Candidate Countries Eurobarometer 2002.1 (as well as Q13 in the
Standard Eurobarometer 56.1 from 2001) asked “Why in your opinion are there people who
live in need?”, and gave four options: (1) Because they have been unlucky; (2) because of
laziness and lack of willpower; (3) because there is  much injustice in our society; (4) It’s an
inevitable part of modern progress.
7 In the European Values Study from 1999/2000 respondents were asked (in variable 186) to
place themselves on a ten point scale ranging from 1 (“The government should take more
responsibility to ensure that everyone is provided“) to 10 (“People should take more
responsibility to provide for themselves”).
8 This is based on question no 62 in the 2003 European Quality of life Survey which asked: “In
the past year, did your household give regular help in the form of either money or food to a
person you know not living in your household (e.g. parents, grown-up children, other
relatives, or someone not related)?”
9 For the development of Turkish fertility rates see Council of Europe (2005: 76), Prime
Ministry Republic of Turkey and Turkish Statistical Institute (2006: 79).
10 On the basis of data on the distribution of the total EU budget, Lithuania is the country
receiving the highest EU subsidies relative to the size of its GNI (2.35 % of its GNI in 2005,
based on net recipient data in Berié 2007: 577). Spain as the country with the highest absolute
sum of net receipts drew a net amount of 6.018 bio Euros in 2005 (Ibid).
11 Before the Eastern enlargement it was feared that18 regions with about 21 million inhabitants
would fall out of the objective 1 support; hence transitory rules were established in order to
avoid a sudden loss of entitlements.
12 For data based on the European Values Study see Gerhards and Hölscher 2005: 68.PAGE 28
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